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The police intelligence division-of-labour
James Sheptycki
ABSTRACT
This article describes the police intelligence division-of-labour. It is argued
that police organisation gains overall coherence in relation to the ‘police
métier’; a rationale that allows protagonists in the police world to make
sense of an irrational workplace structure where personal loyalty, trust
and honour (not formal organisational logic) form the basis of action
and compliance. The concept of the police métier is defined in terms of
the police professional concern with the mastery of surveillance and
coercion in the reproduction of order, the making of crime and the
governance of insecurity, and it is the polestar of the police mindset.
The article describes the police intelligence division-of-labour paying
specific attention to four different aspects of intelligence activity: the
acquisition of intelligence or information; the analysis of information in
the production of intelligence; tasking and co-ordination on the basis of
intelligence ‘product’; or being tasked on that same basis. The descriptive
analysis presented here is useful in several respects. Firstly it provides a
basis for the comparative study of police intelligence work and its
configuration within broader processes of security governance.
Secondly, it provides a prototypical organisational map useful
understanding the orientation of particular units – the organisational
elements of policework (e.g. of drug squads, primary response, public
order and homicide investigation units) – within the broader police
division-of-labour. Lastly, it provides a complex view of issues
concerning democratic governance of ‘the police’ as they are configured
as nodes within broader networks of security governance.
Introduction
In the sociology study of police organisation, the term boundary has been understood to refer to
organisational units (intra-organisational policing) and institutions (inter-organisational policing)
and the co-ordination work necessary for their coherent operation has emerged as an important
concern (Giacomantonio 2014, 2015). Understanding how different police units form, function and
interact with each other in police organisations is a vital aspect of police research. This paper
describes the police intelligence division-of-labour, here understood as intra-organisational infor-
mation and intelligence flows bounded within the archetypal form of the multi-functional urban
police service. It is a useful if not necessary prior step in understanding how inter-organisational
boundaries work in police organisation (Sanders and Henderson 2013; Delpeuch and Ross 2016).
As certain police researchers will know from experience, there is a sense of being ‘inside’ the police
organisation and some author’s use of the dramaturgical metaphor draws specific attention to both
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‘front stage’ and ‘back stage’ arenas for the performance of policing (Young 1991; Manning 1997;
Moskos 2008, Fassin 2011). From such a perspective, multi-agency work has both ‘open’ and
‘hidden’ aspects for the actors participating in what amounts to co-operative organisational bound-
ary maintenance (Giacomantonio 2014; 2015). If a particular police institution is acting as a node in a
broader network of security, what goes on inside the node (Sheptycki 2017)? A general theory of
police information networking is the Holly Grail of the intelligence-led policing perspective, long
sought and yet to be discovered (James 2003, 2013; Ratcliffe 2016). What is presented here is
more modest. It is part of an effort to make theoretical sense of a mass of data collected over a
number of years in North America, Europe and the UK.1 These data include notes from field obser-
vation, focus group discussions, documentary analysis and qualitative conversational interviewing
in many different police agencies. The frame of analysis is limited to English language scholarly litera-
ture on police organisation and police intelligence in North America, the UK and Europe. What is
offered here is a general description concerning how a multiplicity of different types of intelligence
and information, knowledge and facts, percolates within a multi-functional division-of-labour organ-
ised around the police métier.
A great deal of the literature on police organisation rests on a sometimes overt, but more often
subconscious belief that it is machine-like. For example, some of the literature on intelligence and
police security networks has used the metaphor of ‘cybernetics’, which is a form of machine-thinking
(e.g. Gill 1998). According to Robert Reiner, bureaucratic rationality, the rule of law and formal
accountability structures in the service of efficient and effective police service have under-pinned
claims to police legitimacy (Reiner 2010). Projecting an image of formal rationality is very important
to police decision-makers and police actors. The police are frequently imagined as a rank-structured,
bureaucratically organised, rational, institutional machine (Maguire 2010; Jobard and de Maillard
2015). As sophisticated research on police organisation further reveals, police organisation seldom
conforms to machine-like rationality (Manning 1997; Maguire and Uchida 2015) and, indeed, some-
times other more powerful motives propel police action (Hobbs 1988). The vital importance of infor-
mal information exchange to the achievement of police organisational goals is acknowledged in the
literature (e.g. Bayer 2010). Nonetheless, the machine metaphor is reoccurring, especially when
articulating measures for controlling police malpractice (Punch 2011) and governing the police
(Jones et al. 1996; Stenning 2009). In the literature on intelligence modelling, flows, cycles and the
management thereof, police organisation is continuously re-imagined as a cybernetic network of
computational analysis (Ratcliffe 2016).
The following discussion develops a vocabulary of seven types or focal points of intelligence and
locates them with reference to an ideal-typification of the modern multi-functional police organis-
ation (Mouhanna 2009; Manning 2010; Jobard and de Maillard 2015; Maguire and Uchida 2015).
There is a deliberate attempt to avoid depicting police organisation as a hierarchical and mechanistic
set of arrangements in recognition that empirical observation has long confirmed that police organ-
isation is idiosyncratic (e.g. Manning and van Maanen 1978; Monjardet 1985, 1996; Manning 1997;
Chan 2003; Marks and Sklansky 2013). According to a report published by the US Department of
Justice, ‘traditional, hierarchical intelligence functions need to be reexamined and replace with co-
operative, fluid structures that can collect information and move intelligence to end users more
quickly (Peterson 2005, p. vii, emphasis mine)’. Since contemporary official expectations are that
police intelligence systems should become more fluid, analytical descriptions ought not to
smuggle mechanistic assumptions in by the back door (Sheptycki 2017). A challenge inherent
when attempting to analytically describe the police intelligence division-of-labour is how to avoid
machine-thinking.
Here it is argued that police organisation gains its overall coherence insofar as it is formed around
what is referred to as the ‘police métier’, a term adopted from Manning (2010). According to the
Oxford English Dictionary, the term métier is derived from ancient Latin and came to the English
language via the Norman French. Originally the term was misterium, from which we get modern
terms like Ministry and Mister. The word is probably also etymologically linked with the term
mysterium, from which we get our modern word mystery. Amétier is someone’s profession, the impli-
cation being that membership includes some secret knowledge which is privilege of professional insi-
ders. The police métier undergirds a specific intuitive grasp of situations peculiar to the police
occupation (Bittner 1970; van Maanen 1974; Young 1991; Chan 2003). Peter K. Manning has made
a persuasive case that translating occurrences from the general lifeworld into criminal ‘incidents’
and perhaps transforming those into a ‘case’ for criminal prosecution is the essential basis and the
sacred centre of the policemétier (Manning 2010, 2016). In this sense, the term policemétier is under-
stood to be a set of habits and assumptions focused on the trope of ‘crime’ that ‘envisions only the
need to control, deter and punish the visible and known contestants’ (Manning 2010, p. 105–106).
Understanding of the term is both broadened and deepened here. Following Brodeur (2007,
2010), Bittner (1970) and others, here the essence of police professionalism is understood to
centre on the mastery of surveillance and coercion in the reproduction of order (Ericson 1982), the
making of crime (Ericson 1981) and the governance of insecurity (Ericson and Haggerty 1997;
Ericson 2007). The ‘fundamental mindset’ (Sklansky 2011) of ‘the police’ is oriented towards their
métier like a sailor to the polestar.
The typical multi-functional police service found cities in North America and the UK, and some
cities in Europe, assumes wide responsibilities – from traffic enforcement to policing protest. In
the discussion that follows, it is understood that the police division-of-labour gains overall coherence
as a set of organisational practices not because of functional command-and-control relationships.
Analytically, they are to be understood in terms of positioning in the police division-of-labour and
the intersecting intelligence foci. The processes undertaken within the police intelligence division-
of-labour – its routines, recipes, rituals and roles – are interpretable in terms of specific orientations
to the police métier.
This article is organised in a number of sections. First is outlined the model police division-of-
labour typical of the modern multi-functional urban police department. This is followed by a brief
enumeration of seven foci of policing intelligence and a discussion of how these relate to various pos-
itions within the police division-of-labour. Analytically speaking, different positions within this con-
figuration are concerned with four different aspects of intelligence activity: the acquisition of
intelligence or information; the analysis of information in the production of intelligence; tasking
and co-ordination on the basis of intelligence ‘product’; or being tasked on that same basis. This
picture of the police intelligence division-of-labour compliments the view of police organisations
consisting of ‘units’ that police the boundaries between themselves (Giacomantonio 2015). Describ-
ing the police intelligence division-of-labour offers a useful guide for future comparative analysis of
specific police institutions. It also provides an organisational map for charting the relations between
different units that make up the contemporary urban police service as described in ethnographic
accounts of, for example, drugs units (Bacon 2016), front-line primary response units (PRUs)
(Moskos 2008), public order units (Jefferson 1990), homicide investigations (Innes 2003) and other
‘units’ that comprise an essential part of the policing web (Brodeur 2010). Further, describing the
police intelligence division-of-labour as it is configured within the typical urban police department
is essential to understanding how it fits in with security governance more generally (Johnston and
Shearing 2003; Shearing and Marks 2011). A fortiori, it raises complex issues regarding the politics
and governance of police (Ericson and Haggerty 2005). Ultimately this contribution helps in explain-
ing the configuration of broader nodal relations of security governance in which police organisation
is ‘interpellated’ (Boussard et al. 2006).2
The police division-of-labour
Police organisations are depicted in organisational diagrams which usually show the office of the
chief at the apex of an organisational pyramid and array police departmental resources below it in
hierarchical fashion reinforcing the image of a ‘chain of command’. This common picture is modestly
inaccurate. The orchestra pays only minimum heed to the conductor, or, in the words of Peter
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(Jones et al. 1996; Stenning 2009). In the literature on intelligence modelling, flows, cycles and the
management thereof, police organisation is continuously re-imagined as a cybernetic network of
computational analysis (Ratcliffe 2016).
The following discussion develops a vocabulary of seven types or focal points of intelligence and
locates them with reference to an ideal-typification of the modern multi-functional police organis-
ation (Mouhanna 2009; Manning 2010; Jobard and de Maillard 2015; Maguire and Uchida 2015).
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quickly (Peterson 2005, p. vii, emphasis mine)’. Since contemporary official expectations are that
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smuggle mechanistic assumptions in by the back door (Sheptycki 2017). A challenge inherent
when attempting to analytically describe the police intelligence division-of-labour is how to avoid
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what is referred to as the ‘police métier’, a term adopted from Manning (2010). According to the
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cation being that membership includes some secret knowledge which is privilege of professional insi-
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as a set of organisational practices not because of functional command-and-control relationships.
Analytically, they are to be understood in terms of positioning in the police division-of-labour and
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itions within the police division-of-labour. Analytically speaking, different positions within this con-
figuration are concerned with four different aspects of intelligence activity: the acquisition of
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picture of the police intelligence division-of-labour compliments the view of police organisations
consisting of ‘units’ that police the boundaries between themselves (Giacomantonio 2015). Describ-
ing the police intelligence division-of-labour offers a useful guide for future comparative analysis of
specific police institutions. It also provides an organisational map for charting the relations between
different units that make up the contemporary urban police service as described in ethnographic
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(Moskos 2008), public order units (Jefferson 1990), homicide investigations (Innes 2003) and other
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police intelligence division-of-labour as it is configured within the typical urban police department
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and governance of police (Ericson and Haggerty 2005). Ultimately this contribution helps in explain-
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The police division-of-labour
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Moskos, ‘The chain of command is a myth. A sergeant cannot be in active command of five units sim-
ultaneously’ (2008, p. 112). Another reason why police organisational charts are rather fictitious is that
they emphasise formal top-down relations between units leaving out the many horizontal connec-
tions and informal relations. They miss the fluidity of an organisation where individuals perform a
variety of functions from patrol to office administration and frequently move between roles through-
out a career lifetime. The ‘hierarchical fiction’ is important to keep in mind when describing the police
division-of-labour in general and abstract terms because the description may blend with common
conceptions of what the police do and how the organisation works which ‘tend to be wrong’
(Smith and Gray 1985, p. 309; Hobbs 1986, p. 198). Manning (2010), police are authoritatively co-ordi-
nated, legitimate organisations that employ practices aimed at tracking, surveillance and arrest and
remain ready to apply force, up to and including fatal force, in pursuit of the general organisational
goal of maintaining social order and governing crime and insecurity. Multi-functional police agencies
are also called upon to undertake a host of social service functions, for example, including responding
to issues concerning homelessness, mental health and psychological distress. In Egon Bittner’s won-
derful turn of phrase, urban police have an emergency role in responding to myriad situations that
cannot be predicted in advance and that can only be characterised as ‘something that ought not to
be happening about which something ought to be done now’ (Bittner 1970; Brodeur 2007). Accord-
ing to Giacomantonio it is ‘hard to imagine a public police force being organised – and considered
legitimate – without at minimum a uniformed patrol division and reactive investigative services that
deal with local crime and order problems’ (2015, p. 20).
Table 1 presents an ideal-type model of the modern multi-functional police service. Manning
observed that police organisations hold in reserve slack personnel resources that can be mobilised
in the event of emergency (Manning 1992, p. 354–355). So, for example, resources indicated under
the auspices of uniformed patrol in this diagram might be mustered under the heading of an oper-
ational public order support unit or an officer who is normally part of a community contact unit may
also have a skill set (rarely put to use) in bomb disposal. Mutable and capable of coming together into
units, squads, or teams that sometimes behave with military precision, the police organisation is flex-
ible while it remains fundamentally oriented around the policemétier. At minimum, the typical multi-
functional police agency will have the capacity to deploy officers on uniform patrol (depicted in the
top left of the diagram and split into three functions: PRUs, community response units (CRUs) and
Table 1. The police division of labour
traffic patrol) and will likely have the capacity to undertake investigations into ‘high volume’ crime
(depicted on the bottom left). Central administrative functions, such as managing human resources
and other administrative records are depicted at the top right-hand side of the diagram. Most, if not
all, North American and British police services have a mixture of specialist detective squads (Hobbs
2013, p. 29) depicted in the bottom centre-left. Increasingly these police agencies are creating cen-
tralised intelligence centres or bureaus which is depicted in the bottom centre right. In this table,
within the intelligence bureau a distinction is drawn between intelligence analysis and intelligence
operations. Lastly, in most medium to large-scale multi-functional police services there are an
array of operational support units – K9 unit, aerial reconnaissance, SWAT, etc. – and these specialist
operational support units are depicted in the lower right-hand quadrant of the diagram. Such units
are expensive to maintain and are, in a sense, a luxury. They are, however, redolent of the police
métier. Percolating through the police division-of-labour is a myriad of knowledge, facts, information
and intelligence that can be described, again in ideal-typical terms, as the seven intelligence foci of
police knowledge work.
Seven foci of police intelligence
Echoing Delpeuch and Ross (2016), there are a plurality of intelligence foci that are put to use in the
police organisation. Different kinds of knowledge, facts and information are considered relevant and
in different ways depending on where particular actors are located within the police division-of-
labour. In ideal-typical terms, there seven foci of police intelligence and chief among them are
those having to do with criminal intelligence and public order intelligence (de Lint 2009; McCue
2014). These foci of intelligence are obviously closely aligned with the police métier. Using these
lenses, police organisations amass information from a variety of sources about known and suspected
criminals, troublesome persons and locations. Analysing these data, police organise to identify occur-
rences that can be translated into incidents and on that basis pursue an organisational response. In
intelligence terms, responses can be reactive, that is intended to support the investigation of past
occurrences for translation into criminal incidents pursuable as cases. A key terminological boundary
here is the distinction between ‘criminal intelligence’ and ‘criminal evidence’. The former has a pro-
jected ‘internal career’, the latter a projected ‘external career’ (Travers and Manzo 1997). Police insi-
ders aim to keep criminal intelligence within the purview of a very narrow audience, whereas
evidence is a matter of public record. Criminal intelligence can also be used as the basis of proactive
policing. Proactive policing occurs when police resources are deployed on the basis of crime analysis
(e.g. geo-temporal crime pattern analysis) with the intention of affecting some future situation
(Manning 2008). Another two intelligence foci are serious organised crime and counter-terrorism.
These lenses also have proactive and reactive aspects and are also closely oriented to the police
métier. They are different for the degree of seriousness accorded to them and the consequently
greater emphasis on proactive intelligence thinking. Whereas criminal intelligence forms a pool of
information which is primarily a source for reactive investigation of crime and occasionally for
more proactive planning, intelligence about serious organised crime and terrorism is thought of pri-
marily in terms of proactive enforcement, opportunity reduction, disruption and prevention (Innes
and Sheptycki 2004; McCulloch and Wilson 2016; Tilley 2016). Organised crime and terrorism intelli-
gence are obviously similar in that both involve a high degree of presumed violence, threat and
danger, but these foci differ from each other because the primary locus of the former concerns
illicit market activity and the latter concerns politically motivated activity. Consequently the lens
used to scope these activities is different in significant respects.
These four foci of police intelligence – criminal intelligence, public order intelligence, serious and
organised crime intelligence and counter-terrorism intelligence – are closely oriented to the police
métier which, as already discussed, is defined as a professional line involving specialist abilities in
the orchestration of surveillance and coercive power in the governance of crime, disorder and inse-
curity. The other three intelligence foci designated here operate at different degrees of variance in
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Moskos, ‘The chain of command is a myth. A sergeant cannot be in active command of five units sim-
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ing to Giacomantonio it is ‘hard to imagine a public police force being organised – and considered
legitimate – without at minimum a uniformed patrol division and reactive investigative services that
deal with local crime and order problems’ (2015, p. 20).
Table 1 presents an ideal-type model of the modern multi-functional police service. Manning
observed that police organisations hold in reserve slack personnel resources that can be mobilised
in the event of emergency (Manning 1992, p. 354–355). So, for example, resources indicated under
the auspices of uniformed patrol in this diagram might be mustered under the heading of an oper-
ational public order support unit or an officer who is normally part of a community contact unit may
also have a skill set (rarely put to use) in bomb disposal. Mutable and capable of coming together into
units, squads, or teams that sometimes behave with military precision, the police organisation is flex-
ible while it remains fundamentally oriented around the policemétier. At minimum, the typical multi-
functional police agency will have the capacity to deploy officers on uniform patrol (depicted in the
top left of the diagram and split into three functions: PRUs, community response units (CRUs) and
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traffic patrol) and will likely have the capacity to undertake investigations into ‘high volume’ crime
(depicted on the bottom left). Central administrative functions, such as managing human resources
and other administrative records are depicted at the top right-hand side of the diagram. Most, if not
all, North American and British police services have a mixture of specialist detective squads (Hobbs
2013, p. 29) depicted in the bottom centre-left. Increasingly these police agencies are creating cen-
tralised intelligence centres or bureaus which is depicted in the bottom centre right. In this table,
within the intelligence bureau a distinction is drawn between intelligence analysis and intelligence
operations. Lastly, in most medium to large-scale multi-functional police services there are an
array of operational support units – K9 unit, aerial reconnaissance, SWAT, etc. – and these specialist
operational support units are depicted in the lower right-hand quadrant of the diagram. Such units
are expensive to maintain and are, in a sense, a luxury. They are, however, redolent of the police
métier. Percolating through the police division-of-labour is a myriad of knowledge, facts, information
and intelligence that can be described, again in ideal-typical terms, as the seven intelligence foci of
police knowledge work.
Seven foci of police intelligence
Echoing Delpeuch and Ross (2016), there are a plurality of intelligence foci that are put to use in the
police organisation. Different kinds of knowledge, facts and information are considered relevant and
in different ways depending on where particular actors are located within the police division-of-
labour. In ideal-typical terms, there seven foci of police intelligence and chief among them are
those having to do with criminal intelligence and public order intelligence (de Lint 2009; McCue
2014). These foci of intelligence are obviously closely aligned with the police métier. Using these
lenses, police organisations amass information from a variety of sources about known and suspected
criminals, troublesome persons and locations. Analysing these data, police organise to identify occur-
rences that can be translated into incidents and on that basis pursue an organisational response. In
intelligence terms, responses can be reactive, that is intended to support the investigation of past
occurrences for translation into criminal incidents pursuable as cases. A key terminological boundary
here is the distinction between ‘criminal intelligence’ and ‘criminal evidence’. The former has a pro-
jected ‘internal career’, the latter a projected ‘external career’ (Travers and Manzo 1997). Police insi-
ders aim to keep criminal intelligence within the purview of a very narrow audience, whereas
evidence is a matter of public record. Criminal intelligence can also be used as the basis of proactive
policing. Proactive policing occurs when police resources are deployed on the basis of crime analysis
(e.g. geo-temporal crime pattern analysis) with the intention of affecting some future situation
(Manning 2008). Another two intelligence foci are serious organised crime and counter-terrorism.
These lenses also have proactive and reactive aspects and are also closely oriented to the police
métier. They are different for the degree of seriousness accorded to them and the consequently
greater emphasis on proactive intelligence thinking. Whereas criminal intelligence forms a pool of
information which is primarily a source for reactive investigation of crime and occasionally for
more proactive planning, intelligence about serious organised crime and terrorism is thought of pri-
marily in terms of proactive enforcement, opportunity reduction, disruption and prevention (Innes
and Sheptycki 2004; McCulloch and Wilson 2016; Tilley 2016). Organised crime and terrorism intelli-
gence are obviously similar in that both involve a high degree of presumed violence, threat and
danger, but these foci differ from each other because the primary locus of the former concerns
illicit market activity and the latter concerns politically motivated activity. Consequently the lens
used to scope these activities is different in significant respects.
These four foci of police intelligence – criminal intelligence, public order intelligence, serious and
organised crime intelligence and counter-terrorism intelligence – are closely oriented to the police
métier which, as already discussed, is defined as a professional line involving specialist abilities in
the orchestration of surveillance and coercive power in the governance of crime, disorder and inse-
curity. The other three intelligence foci designated here operate at different degrees of variance in
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orientation to the policemétier. So-called ‘community intelligence’ is based on a wide variety of infor-
mational sources and is not necessarily related only to the occurrence of crime and instances or
locations of public disorder. Thinking within the police métier, community intelligence can provide
useful clues, for example, if focused through the lenses of serious and organised crime or counter-
terrorism analysis (Bayer 2010, p. 21–22, Delpeuch and Ross 2016). On the other hand, community
and problem oriented policing prescribes a social crime prevention focus on community intelligence
that aims to alter the circumstances productive of crime and disorder in the first instance (Ekblom
2003; Mouhanna 2008; Punch et al. 2008; Bullock 2013, 2014; Leighton 2016). Community intelligence
can be focused on community capacity building, but doing so is tangential to the police métier
(Skogan 2016). External audiences can regard the gathering of community intelligence in a variable
light – ranging from demanding of service, grudging acceptance of presence, to not-so-welcome
resentment to out-right hostile reception (Edwards and Hughes 2005; Hughes and Rowe 2007).
Because community intelligence may be pursued in tandem with other intelligence foci and
because some preoccupations of this lens do not necessarily clearly focus the police métier an
aura of ambivalence surrounds it and this is true for both internal and external actors.
Multi-agency co-ordination intelligence is another foci which features a certain degree of variance
with the police métier. In some contexts, multiple agencies from the police sector may be involved in
joint operations or task forces. In other contexts multi-agency co-ordination intelligence involves
working with non-police agencies. In either instance, multi-agency intelligence co-ordination can
involve both private and public agencies. In all instances, when the multi-agency co-ordination intel-
ligence lens is in use there are trust issues around information sharing between actors internal and
external to the police métier (Aden 2016). Intrinsically, all constituent units in a given police organis-
ation will have some concern with the ability to co-ordinate with other units (Giacomantonio 2015).
Therefore multi-agency co-ordination intelligence is integral to police organisation but vacillating in
orientation to the police métier.
The seventh and final foci concerns managerial and business intelligence which is at variance with
the police métier because, although it aims at the strategic and, to a lesser extent, tactical manage-
ment of police resources, the language of management draws heavily on the métier of the Business
School and of new public sector management. In principle aimed at the efficient and effective man-
agement of police capacity, there can be discrepancies between the optimal view focused as man-
agerial and business intelligence and other intelligence foci. For example, internal police threat
assessments regarding the relative harm posed by different identifiable groups participating in
illicit economic activity can be at variance with efficiency and effectiveness criteria used to evaluate
the deployment of police resources. As a consequence proactive operational projects can end up
focusing on the easy targets rather than the more difficult to get at but more socially harmful activi-
ties of other groups. Another example might be community intelligence gathering, where the effi-
cacy of using information and police knowledge to contribute to community capacity building is
undermined by quantitative metrics that measure street level enforcement activity. Yet another
example could be management metrics for traffic policing that focus on issuing traffic citations
and thereby obscure thinking about affecting road safety through environmental design.
These seven foci of police intelligence are different cognitive lenses that define police ‘knowledge
work’ and make sense of the division of expert knowledge that comprises the police intelligence div-
ision-of-labour (cf. Haggerty and Ericson 2000; Ericson 1994). These lenses are affected by positioning
within the police division-of-labour and the use of different intelligence foci are analytically distinct
but may be practically intertwined. For example, general investigators who are normally interested in
criminal intelligence having to do with volume crimes like assault, theft and robbery, may co-ordinate
with a CRU in a multi-agency project affecting instances of vandalism in a particular area. In such an
instance, investigative intelligence, community intelligence and multi-agency co-ordination intelli-
gence foci may all be deployed in different positions within the police division-of-labour in the
orchestration of operations. Observations about information boundaries and connections between
and across units that constitute the typical urban police service are revealed as plural and complex
and yet they attain coherence relative to the police métier.
Location and function of intelligence foci in the police division-of-labour
Table 2 classifies the police intelligence division-of-labour according to an analytical grid formed by
the intersection of various roles within the police division-of-labour with the variety of intelligence
foci. Institutionally speaking in an abstract sense there are four relevant activities: the acquisition
(q) of intelligence or information; the analysis (an) of information in the production of intelligence;
tasking and co-ordination (ta/co) on the basis of intelligence ‘product’; or being operationally tasked
(op/ta) on that same basis (Ratcliffe and Sheptycki 2009). These four activities are largely oriented
with respect to the underlying logic of the police métier. There are different ways which the acqui-
sition of intelligence can be undertaken, depending on position and role. For example, traffic enfor-
cement units acquire intelligence through high volume license plate checks and special patrol units
do the same by using street identity checks. On the other hand special investigations units and the
intelligence bureau may, between them, compete over (and thereby confound) the acquisition of
investigative intelligence and thereby distort the strategic intelligence analysis. Analysis is supposed
to form the basis of decision-making in the operational tasking of units. Since PRUs are considered
the ‘backbone’ of the archetypal urban police service, it is especially interesting to see how this
role is configured by the demands of intelligence-led policing.
Scanning across the top row of the table shows the ‘front line’ PRUs. These units are often very
busy answering to calls for service dispatched centrally. In this respect, such units are operationally
tasked through intelligence and information processes. During down time, when not involved in
primary response such units may be tasked with responsibility to acquire information suitable for
entry on to police databases that could be put to other uses, for example identity checks and
vehicle license checks may be subject to geo-temporal analysis useful in operationally tasking oper-
ational support units such as a special patrol group (SPG). When it comes to public order intelligence,
PRUs are more often tasked by system information demands than they are involved in information
Table 2. Grid analysis of the police intelligence division-of-labour.
Notes: q: acquisition of intelligence/information; ta/co: tasking & co-ordination;
an: analysis; op/ta: operationally tasked with intelligence.
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orientation to the policemétier. So-called ‘community intelligence’ is based on a wide variety of infor-
mational sources and is not necessarily related only to the occurrence of crime and instances or
locations of public disorder. Thinking within the police métier, community intelligence can provide
useful clues, for example, if focused through the lenses of serious and organised crime or counter-
terrorism analysis (Bayer 2010, p. 21–22, Delpeuch and Ross 2016). On the other hand, community
and problem oriented policing prescribes a social crime prevention focus on community intelligence
that aims to alter the circumstances productive of crime and disorder in the first instance (Ekblom
2003; Mouhanna 2008; Punch et al. 2008; Bullock 2013, 2014; Leighton 2016). Community intelligence
can be focused on community capacity building, but doing so is tangential to the police métier
(Skogan 2016). External audiences can regard the gathering of community intelligence in a variable
light – ranging from demanding of service, grudging acceptance of presence, to not-so-welcome
resentment to out-right hostile reception (Edwards and Hughes 2005; Hughes and Rowe 2007).
Because community intelligence may be pursued in tandem with other intelligence foci and
because some preoccupations of this lens do not necessarily clearly focus the police métier an
aura of ambivalence surrounds it and this is true for both internal and external actors.
Multi-agency co-ordination intelligence is another foci which features a certain degree of variance
with the police métier. In some contexts, multiple agencies from the police sector may be involved in
joint operations or task forces. In other contexts multi-agency co-ordination intelligence involves
working with non-police agencies. In either instance, multi-agency intelligence co-ordination can
involve both private and public agencies. In all instances, when the multi-agency co-ordination intel-
ligence lens is in use there are trust issues around information sharing between actors internal and
external to the police métier (Aden 2016). Intrinsically, all constituent units in a given police organis-
ation will have some concern with the ability to co-ordinate with other units (Giacomantonio 2015).
Therefore multi-agency co-ordination intelligence is integral to police organisation but vacillating in
orientation to the police métier.
The seventh and final foci concerns managerial and business intelligence which is at variance with
the police métier because, although it aims at the strategic and, to a lesser extent, tactical manage-
ment of police resources, the language of management draws heavily on the métier of the Business
School and of new public sector management. In principle aimed at the efficient and effective man-
agement of police capacity, there can be discrepancies between the optimal view focused as man-
agerial and business intelligence and other intelligence foci. For example, internal police threat
assessments regarding the relative harm posed by different identifiable groups participating in
illicit economic activity can be at variance with efficiency and effectiveness criteria used to evaluate
the deployment of police resources. As a consequence proactive operational projects can end up
focusing on the easy targets rather than the more difficult to get at but more socially harmful activi-
ties of other groups. Another example might be community intelligence gathering, where the effi-
cacy of using information and police knowledge to contribute to community capacity building is
undermined by quantitative metrics that measure street level enforcement activity. Yet another
example could be management metrics for traffic policing that focus on issuing traffic citations
and thereby obscure thinking about affecting road safety through environmental design.
These seven foci of police intelligence are different cognitive lenses that define police ‘knowledge
work’ and make sense of the division of expert knowledge that comprises the police intelligence div-
ision-of-labour (cf. Haggerty and Ericson 2000; Ericson 1994). These lenses are affected by positioning
within the police division-of-labour and the use of different intelligence foci are analytically distinct
but may be practically intertwined. For example, general investigators who are normally interested in
criminal intelligence having to do with volume crimes like assault, theft and robbery, may co-ordinate
with a CRU in a multi-agency project affecting instances of vandalism in a particular area. In such an
instance, investigative intelligence, community intelligence and multi-agency co-ordination intelli-
gence foci may all be deployed in different positions within the police division-of-labour in the
orchestration of operations. Observations about information boundaries and connections between
and across units that constitute the typical urban police service are revealed as plural and complex
and yet they attain coherence relative to the police métier.
Location and function of intelligence foci in the police division-of-labour
Table 2 classifies the police intelligence division-of-labour according to an analytical grid formed by
the intersection of various roles within the police division-of-labour with the variety of intelligence
foci. Institutionally speaking in an abstract sense there are four relevant activities: the acquisition
(q) of intelligence or information; the analysis (an) of information in the production of intelligence;
tasking and co-ordination (ta/co) on the basis of intelligence ‘product’; or being operationally tasked
(op/ta) on that same basis (Ratcliffe and Sheptycki 2009). These four activities are largely oriented
with respect to the underlying logic of the police métier. There are different ways which the acqui-
sition of intelligence can be undertaken, depending on position and role. For example, traffic enfor-
cement units acquire intelligence through high volume license plate checks and special patrol units
do the same by using street identity checks. On the other hand special investigations units and the
intelligence bureau may, between them, compete over (and thereby confound) the acquisition of
investigative intelligence and thereby distort the strategic intelligence analysis. Analysis is supposed
to form the basis of decision-making in the operational tasking of units. Since PRUs are considered
the ‘backbone’ of the archetypal urban police service, it is especially interesting to see how this
role is configured by the demands of intelligence-led policing.
Scanning across the top row of the table shows the ‘front line’ PRUs. These units are often very
busy answering to calls for service dispatched centrally. In this respect, such units are operationally
tasked through intelligence and information processes. During down time, when not involved in
primary response such units may be tasked with responsibility to acquire information suitable for
entry on to police databases that could be put to other uses, for example identity checks and
vehicle license checks may be subject to geo-temporal analysis useful in operationally tasking oper-
ational support units such as a special patrol group (SPG). When it comes to public order intelligence,
PRUs are more often tasked by system information demands than they are involved in information
Table 2. Grid analysis of the police intelligence division-of-labour.
Notes: q: acquisition of intelligence/information; ta/co: tasking & co-ordination;
an: analysis; op/ta: operationally tasked with intelligence.
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acquisition. Nonetheless, such units may be involved in gathering public order intelligence and, with
the variety of technological aids to hand increasingly relay important information ‘in real time’. PRUs
may be operationally tasked on the basis of intelligence analysis involving serious and organised
crime, counter-terrorism and community safety intelligence, but are rarely involved in intelligence
acquisition focused specifically along these lines. Similarly, these units may be tasked on the basis
of multi-agency co-ordination intelligence, but are not primarily involved in its production and are
not considered useful repositories of such knowledge themselves. In terms of managerial and
business intelligence, these units are managed on the basis of a number of key performance indi-
cators, based on the expectations of the police métier; that is to say having to do with enforcement
outcomes. Response times and occurrence resolutions are all subject to recording rules for the pur-
poses of management. Studies of front-line police patrol reveal PRUs to be subject to the vagaries of
computer-aided command-and-control systems and, apart from easing behaviour, there is very little
discretion (Mastrofski 2005; Sanders and Hannem 2012).
Urban police agencies may differ in the organisational capacity put into primary response to
citizen calls for service. Scanning across the second row of Table 2, in some police services, policework
can take the form of community and neighbourhood teams (Edwards and Hughes 2005; Hughes and
Rowe 2007; Gauthier 2016; Leighton 2016). In some versions the primary raison d’être of community
officers is the acquisition, analysis, and tasking and co-ordination of multi-agency responses involving
health (including mental health), education, social welfare and public housing all on the basis of com-
munity safety intelligence (Cockbain and Knutson 2013; Tilley 2013; Skogan 2016). In this event the
convergent intersection of the CRU with a comprehensive community intelligence and multi-agency
co-ordination intelligence foci could produce a self-tasking local area police and community safety
partnership or a community security hub (Edwards and Hughes 2005; Bullock 2014). There are
dangers. The external sharing of police information about crime and community safety can have per-
ceived negative effects, for example, undermining property values (Barker 2016). In practice, the
modus operandi of community policing is at variance with the police métier and, in any case, these
capacities are being increasingly absorbed into counter-terrorism and serious organised crime intel-
ligence acquisition (Murphy 2007; Klausen 2009). CRUs can be tasked with acquiring information and
intelligence for other purposes, for example, in helping to acquire criminal investigative or public
order intelligence, or organised crime and counter-terrorism intelligence. This position in the
police division-of-labour involves multi-agency co-ordination intelligence work and boundary main-
tenance, because it often concerns work with non-police agencies. Officers in these positions act as
conduits of information into the policing information environment and may selectively share police
information with outside partners. Relevant managerial and business intelligence concerning the
activities of those positioned in this part of the police division-of-labour is often project based. Com-
munity officers develop project plans, execute and evaluate them providing data for management
purposes. Since community safety is reflected in the absence of indicators of crime and public dis-
order, it is often difficult for officers in these positions to produce management intelligence in
direct concurrence with the policemétier. Their greatest utility, from the point of view of police organ-
isation, is the ability to acquire a broad range of information from different outside organisations,
institutions and groups in the police task environment.
A typical multi-functional police agency will often undertake road traffic safety enforcement. In
agencies of sufficient size this function can be consigned to specialists in the division-of-labour.
Road traffic enforcement can be an end in itself but it can also be a pretext for intelligence acquisition
in relation to other matters (Ingram 2007). Impaired driving stop checks deter drunk driving and
associated license plate check data can be geo-temporally coded and put to other uses. The
public order intelligence focus comes to bear when traffic units are tasked on a strategic basis in
order to manage road congestion during parades, demonstrations and other large-scale events.
When it comes to serious and organised crime intelligence and counter-terrorism intelligence foci,
traffic units can have some peripheral involvement. For example, the rules of the road can provide
pretexts for stopping vehicles and this can be useful in terms of acquiring relevant intelligence or
information, or non-traffic enforcement outcomes (such as arrest for possession of narcotics) can
occur. Seen through the lens of managerial and business intelligence, these units are primarily
subject to key performance indicators relating to traffic citations for example: driving without a
license or while impaired, speeding or distracted driving. Traffic policing could contribute to signifi-
cantly to community safety if its allied intelligence processes for acquisition and analysis produced
tasking requirements for the enhancement of road safety through environmental design; instead
of which this role is harnessed to metrics that emphasise operational tasking for enforcement alone.
Investigative units are considered fundamental to the police division-of-labour. Traditionally, this
role has been concerned with ‘high volume’ crime such as assault, theft and robbery. In matters
related to criminal intelligence, investigative detectives both acquire and analyse information and
they do so primarily in order to make cases and undertake arrests. A focus on public order intelligence
analysis can operationally task investigative operations, for example concerning open-air drug and
prostitution markets which impact community quality of life matters. Generalist investigative work
is usually institutionally separate from serious and organised crime or counter-terrorism intelligence
as well as the work of special units such as the ‘vice squad’, ‘drug squad’, ‘hold-up squad’. The focus of
the managerial and business intelligence lens on this aspect of the police division-of-labour reveals a
central concern with clearing cases regarding relatively minor occurrences of theft, damage to prop-
erty and violence. Measures of effectiveness are understood in terms of the rise and fall of criminal
incidents in relation to numbers of arrests.
For a variety of historical reasons, most police agencies retain cadres of specialist detectives
formed into squads which are a major source of idiosyncrasy in the organisation of policing
(Manning 1980, 1997, 2016). Homicide, armed robbery, guns and gangs, drugs and vice, and now
‘cybercrime’ offer some of the major pretexts for the formation and retention of specialist investiga-
tive units. These positions are covalent with the policemétier and consequently high status within the
occupation. Such units are distinguished by their active and systematic approach to intelligence gath-
ering marked by a specific investigative focus. In the case of specialist homicide and armed robbery
units, the work is reactive: occurrences are translated by detectives into criminal incidents upon
which they then try to build into cases. In the case of specialist anti-gang and drug units, work is
often proactive: through the intensive use of surveillance teams, these squads gather information
on particular individuals and groups for the purposes of criminal prosecution, frequently using organ-
ised crime and criminal conspiracy laws to do so. Such units are notorious hoarders of intelligence,
because monopoly knowledge protects institutional turf. In some jurisdictions police services have
created specialist units in response to political crime. For example, the development of Special
Branch in the UK in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was a response to the so-
called Irish question. A focus on multi-agency co-ordination intelligence reveals tensions around
this role, where external security agencies compete with nascent or existing specialist political
crime units for operational tasking responsibility in relation to counter-terrorism. Special squads
may also seek to acquire intelligence from and about the community or communities in their task
environment so as to analyse and plan for tasking in operations and projects. Especially when it
involves information sharing for proactive covert surveillance, multi-agency co-ordination intelli-
gence work is highly circumscribed and is less about information sharing than it is intelligence acqui-
sition. Managerial and business intelligence concerning the operation of special squads is concerned
with project costs (e.g. measured in over-time pay) as against the value of making high-profile cases
or achieving other markers of success. Sufficiently oriented to specialist investigative functions
regarded as essential to the police métier, these high status units exhibit a relatively high degree
of discretionary activity (Manning 1980, 1997; Hobbs 1988; Marx and Fijnaut 1995; Billingsley et al.
2001). This self-tasking and specialisation is at odds with some theories of intelligence-led policing
which stress centralisation of strategic intelligence for the purposes of tasking and co-ordination
(James 2013).
Intelligence bureaus, acting as general repositories for system-wide analytical capability, are seen
to be increasingly important in the orchestration of the police intelligence division-of-labour. These
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acquisition. Nonetheless, such units may be involved in gathering public order intelligence and, with
the variety of technological aids to hand increasingly relay important information ‘in real time’. PRUs
may be operationally tasked on the basis of intelligence analysis involving serious and organised
crime, counter-terrorism and community safety intelligence, but are rarely involved in intelligence
acquisition focused specifically along these lines. Similarly, these units may be tasked on the basis
of multi-agency co-ordination intelligence, but are not primarily involved in its production and are
not considered useful repositories of such knowledge themselves. In terms of managerial and
business intelligence, these units are managed on the basis of a number of key performance indi-
cators, based on the expectations of the police métier; that is to say having to do with enforcement
outcomes. Response times and occurrence resolutions are all subject to recording rules for the pur-
poses of management. Studies of front-line police patrol reveal PRUs to be subject to the vagaries of
computer-aided command-and-control systems and, apart from easing behaviour, there is very little
discretion (Mastrofski 2005; Sanders and Hannem 2012).
Urban police agencies may differ in the organisational capacity put into primary response to
citizen calls for service. Scanning across the second row of Table 2, in some police services, policework
can take the form of community and neighbourhood teams (Edwards and Hughes 2005; Hughes and
Rowe 2007; Gauthier 2016; Leighton 2016). In some versions the primary raison d’être of community
officers is the acquisition, analysis, and tasking and co-ordination of multi-agency responses involving
health (including mental health), education, social welfare and public housing all on the basis of com-
munity safety intelligence (Cockbain and Knutson 2013; Tilley 2013; Skogan 2016). In this event the
convergent intersection of the CRU with a comprehensive community intelligence and multi-agency
co-ordination intelligence foci could produce a self-tasking local area police and community safety
partnership or a community security hub (Edwards and Hughes 2005; Bullock 2014). There are
dangers. The external sharing of police information about crime and community safety can have per-
ceived negative effects, for example, undermining property values (Barker 2016). In practice, the
modus operandi of community policing is at variance with the police métier and, in any case, these
capacities are being increasingly absorbed into counter-terrorism and serious organised crime intel-
ligence acquisition (Murphy 2007; Klausen 2009). CRUs can be tasked with acquiring information and
intelligence for other purposes, for example, in helping to acquire criminal investigative or public
order intelligence, or organised crime and counter-terrorism intelligence. This position in the
police division-of-labour involves multi-agency co-ordination intelligence work and boundary main-
tenance, because it often concerns work with non-police agencies. Officers in these positions act as
conduits of information into the policing information environment and may selectively share police
information with outside partners. Relevant managerial and business intelligence concerning the
activities of those positioned in this part of the police division-of-labour is often project based. Com-
munity officers develop project plans, execute and evaluate them providing data for management
purposes. Since community safety is reflected in the absence of indicators of crime and public dis-
order, it is often difficult for officers in these positions to produce management intelligence in
direct concurrence with the policemétier. Their greatest utility, from the point of view of police organ-
isation, is the ability to acquire a broad range of information from different outside organisations,
institutions and groups in the police task environment.
A typical multi-functional police agency will often undertake road traffic safety enforcement. In
agencies of sufficient size this function can be consigned to specialists in the division-of-labour.
Road traffic enforcement can be an end in itself but it can also be a pretext for intelligence acquisition
in relation to other matters (Ingram 2007). Impaired driving stop checks deter drunk driving and
associated license plate check data can be geo-temporally coded and put to other uses. The
public order intelligence focus comes to bear when traffic units are tasked on a strategic basis in
order to manage road congestion during parades, demonstrations and other large-scale events.
When it comes to serious and organised crime intelligence and counter-terrorism intelligence foci,
traffic units can have some peripheral involvement. For example, the rules of the road can provide
pretexts for stopping vehicles and this can be useful in terms of acquiring relevant intelligence or
information, or non-traffic enforcement outcomes (such as arrest for possession of narcotics) can
occur. Seen through the lens of managerial and business intelligence, these units are primarily
subject to key performance indicators relating to traffic citations for example: driving without a
license or while impaired, speeding or distracted driving. Traffic policing could contribute to signifi-
cantly to community safety if its allied intelligence processes for acquisition and analysis produced
tasking requirements for the enhancement of road safety through environmental design; instead
of which this role is harnessed to metrics that emphasise operational tasking for enforcement alone.
Investigative units are considered fundamental to the police division-of-labour. Traditionally, this
role has been concerned with ‘high volume’ crime such as assault, theft and robbery. In matters
related to criminal intelligence, investigative detectives both acquire and analyse information and
they do so primarily in order to make cases and undertake arrests. A focus on public order intelligence
analysis can operationally task investigative operations, for example concerning open-air drug and
prostitution markets which impact community quality of life matters. Generalist investigative work
is usually institutionally separate from serious and organised crime or counter-terrorism intelligence
as well as the work of special units such as the ‘vice squad’, ‘drug squad’, ‘hold-up squad’. The focus of
the managerial and business intelligence lens on this aspect of the police division-of-labour reveals a
central concern with clearing cases regarding relatively minor occurrences of theft, damage to prop-
erty and violence. Measures of effectiveness are understood in terms of the rise and fall of criminal
incidents in relation to numbers of arrests.
For a variety of historical reasons, most police agencies retain cadres of specialist detectives
formed into squads which are a major source of idiosyncrasy in the organisation of policing
(Manning 1980, 1997, 2016). Homicide, armed robbery, guns and gangs, drugs and vice, and now
‘cybercrime’ offer some of the major pretexts for the formation and retention of specialist investiga-
tive units. These positions are covalent with the policemétier and consequently high status within the
occupation. Such units are distinguished by their active and systematic approach to intelligence gath-
ering marked by a specific investigative focus. In the case of specialist homicide and armed robbery
units, the work is reactive: occurrences are translated by detectives into criminal incidents upon
which they then try to build into cases. In the case of specialist anti-gang and drug units, work is
often proactive: through the intensive use of surveillance teams, these squads gather information
on particular individuals and groups for the purposes of criminal prosecution, frequently using organ-
ised crime and criminal conspiracy laws to do so. Such units are notorious hoarders of intelligence,
because monopoly knowledge protects institutional turf. In some jurisdictions police services have
created specialist units in response to political crime. For example, the development of Special
Branch in the UK in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was a response to the so-
called Irish question. A focus on multi-agency co-ordination intelligence reveals tensions around
this role, where external security agencies compete with nascent or existing specialist political
crime units for operational tasking responsibility in relation to counter-terrorism. Special squads
may also seek to acquire intelligence from and about the community or communities in their task
environment so as to analyse and plan for tasking in operations and projects. Especially when it
involves information sharing for proactive covert surveillance, multi-agency co-ordination intelli-
gence work is highly circumscribed and is less about information sharing than it is intelligence acqui-
sition. Managerial and business intelligence concerning the operation of special squads is concerned
with project costs (e.g. measured in over-time pay) as against the value of making high-profile cases
or achieving other markers of success. Sufficiently oriented to specialist investigative functions
regarded as essential to the police métier, these high status units exhibit a relatively high degree
of discretionary activity (Manning 1980, 1997; Hobbs 1988; Marx and Fijnaut 1995; Billingsley et al.
2001). This self-tasking and specialisation is at odds with some theories of intelligence-led policing
which stress centralisation of strategic intelligence for the purposes of tasking and co-ordination
(James 2013).
Intelligence bureaus, acting as general repositories for system-wide analytical capability, are seen
to be increasingly important in the orchestration of the police intelligence division-of-labour. These
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are places where all manner of acquired information can be collated, filed and formatted – in short
analysed – forming the basis for co-ordinated strategic and tactical operational tasking. As indicated
in Table 1, a distinction between operational and analytical intelligence can be drawn. The former is
concerned with different modes of intelligence acquisition. This includes mobile surveillance teams,
electronic and cyber surveillance, informant handling and covert police operations. There is a signifi-
cant overlap with the intelligence acquisition work of some special squads (Dunnighan and Norris
1999; Billingsley et al. 2001; James 2013; Manning 2016). In new and innovative areas of police
work – for example, with regard to sexual offences with an ‘on-line’ or ‘cyber’ element, human traf-
ficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation, or counter-terrorism and political crime – sometimes
intelligence bureaus have taken responsibility, preempting the formation of new special squads or
absorbing existing ones. A difficulty is that such bureaus often do not have the operational capacity
to undertake enforcement operations and affect arrests and therefore must task and co-ordinate
other units in order to do so. Scanning across the relevant row in Table 2, it can be seen that the
ideal-typical Intelligence Bureau works to acquire and analyse relevant data, information and knowl-
edge across six of the seven foci and on that basis aim to task and co-ordinate the work of other units.
The practical limits of data warehousing are mitigated by the ambit of the policemétier and the habits
of specific organisations. Operational role differences are revealed in the varied orientations to the
intelligence division-of-labour and sometimes organisational rivalries are observed (Manning
2016). Intelligence bureaus normally work with information that is intelligence. Special squads tra-
ditionally work with information that may become evidence. Moreover, special squads have the
ability to mount enforcement operations, whereas the Intelligence Bureau typically does not. Disrup-
tion techniques are based on intelligence (Innes and Sheptycki 2004; Tilley 2016) and inter- and intra-
organisational multi-agency collaboration intelligence may involve the production of evidence so
there is a constant need to manage the evidence-intelligence boundary. Intelligence bureaus
produce threat assessments and a variety of intelligence products for tasking and co-ordination of
other units. Threat assessments with a projected internal career guide resource allocation decisions
in operational planning. Threat assessments with a projected external career are intended to affect
the perceptions of outside audiences. Risk assessments consider possible negative consequences
for the organisation in the event of project failure. Intelligence Bureaus can potentially monopolise
intelligence operations and analysis and, through tasking and co-ordination routines, thereby seek
to exercise control of other units. If intelligence bureaus also have direct control of operational enfor-
cement means they could be fuly self-tasking and in that event are potentially a ‘firm within a firm’.
Seen through the lens of managerial and business intelligence, the routine work of such centres is
unquantifiable. Management evaluation is based on project outcomes and as long as there are no
misadventures, such units are largely inviolable. It is now difficult to imagine a multi-functional
police organisation that did not have facilities for managing large police databases, undertaking
analytical work, formulating threat and risk assessments and recommending alternative operational
plans.
There are a variety of operational support units in different police services. Common examples are
K9 and mounted units, marine and aerial units, emergency response teams (i.e. ‘SWAT’ units), SPGs
and riot squads. In virtually all instances, operational support teams are tasked on the basis of intelli-
gence filtered through one or another of the intelligence foci. For example, mounted units can be
deployed in the context of community policing or public order operations. Dog handlers and
aerial reconnaissance units can be tasked to gather either evidence or intelligence. Where they
exist, marine units serve multiple functions inclusive of primary response, traffic control and police
community patrol on rivers, lakes and waterways and have similar relations to the police intelligence
division-of-labour as does land-based front-line policing. Operational support units – the SPG (which
are hand-picked units of uniformed patrol officers trained to undertake intensive field operations),
the riot squad (trained to for large-scale public order events) and the emergency task force (ETF
who are trained in special weapons and tactics), or specialists in VIP ‘close protection’ and bomb
disposal – all offer gradations in orientation to the police métier. Often important symbols of
police organisational potency, units like the mounted section (which reflect tradition and, hence,
legitimacy) and the aerial surveillance unit (ensuring order with ‘eyes in the sky’) are difficult to
subject to managerial and business intelligence solutions. Officers who deploy in many of these
specialist units, often only do so on a part-time, ‘as need’ basis and normally fulfil work commitments
in other roles.
The managerial and business intelligence lens is the last line of consideration in the police div-
ision-of-labour. As can be seen in Table 2, in ideal-typical terms, managerial and business intelligence
does not intake information using any of the intelligence foci already enumerated. Managerial intelli-
gence analysis is divorced from criminal intelligence and public order intelligence analyses, as it is
from the details of serious and organised crime, counter-terrorism and community policing. Business
analytics operate at a distance from the policemétier. The metrics for business and managerial intelli-
gence analysis do not concern the ‘dirty details’ of operational police information. For example, it is
possible to know the fuel bills and over-time costs for mobile covert surveillance in a given context
without knowing the operational details subsequent to the legal warrant authorising the operation.
Business and managerial intelligence units have access to organisational systems data for the pur-
poses of analysis and assessment of agency efficiency, effectiveness and economy. Strategic
decisions about organisational tasking, co-ordination and resource allocation are made on the
basis of business intelligence analysis. Occasionally, management units may undertake community
surveys gathering information on community issues for the purposes of gauging police legitimacy,
but these are not usually considered to be sources of operationally useful community intelligence.
Administration in police organisations tends also to assume responsibility for a number of ancillary
intelligence roles, in addition to things like archiving records concerning human resource allocation,
quality assurance business and corporate planning – for example: corporate communications, legal
and media relations and facilitation of freedom of information requests. In some of the larger police
organisations, a ‘real time operations centre’ (RTOC) exists and is co-located within the administration
offices. In the future these intelligence hubs will commonly operate on the basis of streams of data
focused through the complete panoply of intelligence foci in ‘real time’ potentially enabling full spec-
trum direct strategic and tactical supervision of front-line uniformed patrol and detectives. Manage-
rial intelligence can distort the police intelligence division-of-labour because economic criteria
systematically misrepresent organisational goals pursued through other intelligence foci and are
therefore a poor source of information to support the democratic governance of the urban police
organisation.
Discussion and conclusion
It is seldom the case that researchers find themselves doing research inside a police organisation that
is not in the midst of ‘transformational change’. Every police organisation I have ever studied is either
in the midst of an operational review, about to undertake a re-organisation based on one, or re-
organisation has recently taken place. As the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus said, ‘ever-
newer waters flow on those who step into the same rivers’ (Warner 1958, p. 26). The question is,
how to picture the river? The previous discussion is the result of an attempt to derive, by the pro-
cesses of analytical induction, a theoretical picture of the endlessly transforming police intelligence
division-of-labour of the typical contemporary urban police service. Accordingly analytical distinc-
tions concerning the police division-of-labour and a variety of intelligence foci provide an analytical
grid for describing the police intelligence division-of-labour. The analysis argued further that this
picture gains organisational coherence relative to the police métier. The model should be broadly
reflective of the situation in Europe, North America and the UK and is useful for comparative purposes
and for understanding the interconnections that make up discrete roles that comprise the police
organisation as a whole. However, it is an abstraction and its usefulness is chiefly that it provokes
future research and thinking. The need for insight is especially acute in matters regarding democratic
oversight of police and security governance.
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Table 2 reveals that some positions in the police intelligence division-of-labour exhibit wide dis-
cretion while others exhibit relatively narrow discretion. This adds substantial complexity to the
classic picture of police organisations as being characterised by high discretion afforded by the
increasing ‘low visibility of decision-making’ as one moves ‘down the hierarchy’ (Goldstein 1960;
Skolnick 1967; Wilson 1968). In this model there is no hierarchy. Instead, the (often unspoken)
logic of the police métier is operationalised by performing a variety of specifiable roles within a
complex division-of-labour rationalised according to the concurrent preoccupations of several differ-
ent intelligence lenses and it is in this sense that the archetypal municipal police service can be said
to be organised. A key feature of the police intelligence division-of-labour appears to be the manage-
ment of the boundary between internally circulated information and intelligence, and evidence. The
later has a projected external career. The boundary between internal and external knowledge is in
continual negotiation with respect to the multi-agency co-ordination intelligence focus, but
certain positions within the division-of-labour are expressly concerned with such boundaries,
albeit in different ways. Investigative units think differently about the boundaries between internally
circulated intelligence and externally released evidence than does the CRU or the media relations
department. CRUs and PRUs are more or less oriented to pole star of the police métier and the
former inevitably play a complicated game with respect to acquiring community intelligence and dis-
seminating police information to the outside world. This complex picture of the police intelligence
division-of-labour raises interesting challenges for democratic governance and adds nuance to our
understanding of the politics of police surveillance and visibility (Ericson and Haggerty 2005).
The analytical grid used here to describe the police intelligence division-of-labour reveals the
informational dissociation of managerial and business intelligence from all other intelligence foci.
Organisational information ‘stove-piping’ is usually thought of negatively in relation to the hoarding
of intelligence by special squads, or by specific operational intelligence focus (say to do with ‘organ-
ised crime’ or ‘terrorism’), but with managerial intelligence the stove pipe effect is system wide. The
entire police division-of-labour is subject to comprehensive surveillance in the service of acquiring
management knowledge by which to strategically task and co-ordinate the organisation according
to a business logic disaffiliated from the police métier. This view of the police intelligence division-
of-labour adds complexity to the long ago observed gap between ‘street cops’ and ‘management
cops’ (Reuss-Ianni 1983; Chan 2001). These structural conditions help to explain the persistent pro-
blems of governing policing by numbers and targets (Young 1991; Perrin 1998; Maguire 2000;
Fassin 2011; de Maillard and Mouhanna 2016) and partly explain the importunate organisational
pathologies that plague police intelligence systems (Sheptycki 2004). Existing research suggests
that the development of RTOCs will likely reinforce organisational pretensions to the rationality of
organisational ‘chain of command’ (Weisburd et al. 2003; Mastrofski 2005, 2007; McCue 2014). The
organisational domination of managerial and business intelligence over the police division-of-labour
focuses on the improvement of artificial metrics of police accountability and again raises complex
questions about democratic police governance, especially in a period where the economics of poli-
cing are dominated by neo-liberal thinking (Sanders and Sheptycki 2016).
This theoretical picture of the police intelligence division-of-labour is not a machine model. It is a
schema for understanding the positioning of people in relation to the police métier, which is here
defined broadly with reference to the professional craft knowledge concerning the means of surveil-
lance and coercion in making crime, reproducing order and governing insecurity. Within this schema
individual people occupy identifiable positions and adjust their work routines, recipes, rituals and
roles with regard to the inter-organisational uses that different kinds of information and intelligence
propose. Those individual adjustments are based on rationally self-interested calculations and per-
sonal considerations that are shaped by situationally conditioned perceptions within the intelligence
division-of-labour oriented to the police métier. The police intelligence division-of-labour is designed
to limit and facilitate access to information on a ‘need to know’ basis, but different positions in the
schema give greater or lesser strategic access to different kinds of information and individual discre-
tion is thereby shaped and limited in different ways. The structure of these informational relations,
both formal and informal, is the seedbed of human organisational politics the irrationality of which is
one of the primary reasons why police institutions are not simple bureaucratic machines (Sheptycki
2017).
This analysis suggests how to begin to explore the ways in which ‘the police’ configure in broader
networks of security governance. The police métier encourages the conservation and strictly limited
application of police power to undertake surveillance and utilise coercive power and all organis-
ational resources are bent to the task of facilitating this. There are a striking number of one-way intel-
ligence channels by which police organisations filter selected knowledge to outside audiences.
Intelligence and information acquisition similarly goes on through multiple channels. Information
sharing straddles boundaries within the division-of-labour and generally the outcome of analysis is
a reflection of the police métier. Police-to-police intra-agency sharing of information is different
that sharing with non-police agencies because of fundamental differences in orientation to the
policemétier as either ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’. Multi-agency co-ordination intelligence processes facili-
tate knowledge about, and exchange with, security network partners. Any resulting selective interpel-
lation of the policemétier into institutionalised collaborations of security governance is an ideological
move by police agents that imbues governance with the stamp of authority.
Notes
1. Due to limitations of word length, fieldwork methods cannot be discussed more fully here. For a general discus-
sion of the use of analytic induction and grounded theory see Glaser and Strauss (2009). For a focused discussion
of fieldwork policework see Manning (1997) and Manning (2006). Methodological considerations underpinning
this particular analysis can be found in: Innes and Sheptycki (2004), Sheptycki (1996, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2004,
2016, 2017).
2. The term ‘interpellation’ is familiar in French political theory and is etymological derived from the Latin interpel-
latio, meaning to arrest or interrupt. Interpellation infers the act of control by means of the power of arrest and it
also gestures at the image of a judicial demand to do or say something. In French political theory the term has
sometimes been used to indicate an ideological and practical process by which people are subject to police
power (Rancière et al. 2001).
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Boundary crossing: networked policing and emergent
‘communities of practice’ in safeguarding children
ABSTRACT
Child safeguarding has come to the forefront of public debate in the UK in
the aftermath of a series of highly publicised incidents of child sexual
exploitation and abuse. These have exposed the inadequacies and failings
of inter-organisational relations between police and key partners. While
the discourse of policing partnerships is now accepted wisdom, progress
has been distinctly hesitant. This paper contributes to understanding both
the challenges and opportunities presented through working across
organisational boundaries in the context of safeguarding children. It draws
on a study of relations within one of the largest Safeguarding Children
partnerships in England, developing insights from Etienne Wenger
regarding the potential of ‘communities of practice’ that innovate on the
basis of everyday learning through ‘boundary work’. We demonstrate how
such networked approaches expose the differential power relations and
sites of conflict between organisations but also provide possibilities to
challenge introspective cultures and foster organisational learning. We
argue that crucial in cultivating effective ‘communities of practice’ are:
shared commitment and purpose; relations of trust; balanced exchange of
information and resources; mutual respect for difference; and an open and
mature dialogue over possible conflicts. Boundary crossing can open
opportunities to foster increased reflexivity among policing professionals,
prompting critical self-reflection on values, ongoing reassessment of
assumptions and questioning of terminology. Yet, there is an inherent
tension in that the learning and innovative potential afforded by emergent
‘communities of practice’ derives from the coexistence and interplay
between both the depth of knowledge within practices and active
boundaries across practices.
Introduction
Risks to children and young people posed by adults have multiple, often inter-related, causes, while
conceptions of the nature of child maltreatment are themselves historically relative and subject to the
shifts across time, place and culture. In recent years, child protection has become increasingly poli-
ticised, notably in England (Parton 2014), often as a proxy for a range of debates about the efficacy of
health, welfare and policing professionals; their expertise, specialisation and interdependent
relations. Safeguarding children against contemporary risks and harms cuts across the responsibil-
ities, competencies and expertise of diverse organisations. It involves the police working closely
with partner agencies – in health, education, social care and youth services inter alia – with
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/),
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
